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Contingent Instrumental and Intrinsic Support:  
Exploring Regime Support in Asia 
Abstract 
This study presents a contextual explanation of regime support by arguing that although an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLQVWUXPHQWDOeconomic calculation and intrinsic democratic value are important 
predictors of political support, the extent to which they matter is contingent on the nature of the 
regime, as defined primarily by democracy.  Using data drawn from the second wave of the Asia 
Barometer (ABS), we find that economic perceptions are less important for regime support in 
democratic countries than they are in authoritarian countries, and an affection for democracy makes 
people more critical of the political system in authoritarian countries than in democratic countries.   
 
Keywords: regime support, economic perceptions, democratic values, multilevel analysis, 
democratic stability 
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To survive and exercise power effectively, any regime, whether democratic or authoritarian, must 
induce a sufficient level of popular support.  A comparison of the sources of political support under 
different regime settings provides a valuable perspective on a series of critical questions, ranging 
from authoritarian resilience to democratic consolidation (Dalton 2004; Diamond 2011; Lewis-Beck 
et al. 2013; Rose et al. 2011).  Earlier studies of regime support identify two types sources at the 
individual level ² a performance-based instrumental calculation and an affection-driven value 
commitment.  In particular, the perceptions of government economic performance and value 
orientations toward democracy are two key factors that have been intensively researched in the 
literature.  It is argued that whether regime support is instrumentally or intrinsically driven is of 
critical importance to the stability and viability of the regime (Easton 1975; Brancati 2014; 
Lewis-Beck et al. 2013; Rose et al. 2011).  However, as yet there is little consensus as to when and 
under what conditions political support is likely to be economic- or value-driven (e.g., Booth and 
Seligson 2009; Norris 1999b).  Moreover, most studies focus separately either on democracies 
(Dalton and Anderson 2011; Lewis-Beck et al. 2013) or autocracies (Chen 2004; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2014; Lü 2014; Rose et al. 2011), shedding little light on how popular support varies across regime 
types.   
 In this study we intend to fill this gap in the literature and present a contextual explanation for 
the sources of regime support by synthesizing insights from studies of individual perceptions and 
values with studies focusing on macro factors such as regime attributes.  We argue that although 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶LQVWUXPHQWDOeconomic calculations and intrinsic political values are important predictors 
of political support, the extent to which they matter is contingent upon the nature of the regime, as 
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defined primarily by democracy.  That is, regime support is shaped by both micro mechanisms (i.e., 
economic calculations and value commitments) and macro contexts in which these micro 
mechanisms are embedded.  Specifically, we hypothesize that people in democracies are less likely 
than those in authoritarian countries to support a political system based on economic concerns.  In 
contrast, citizens in democracies are more likely than citizens in autocracies to support a political 
system based on their affective identification with democratic values.   
 Drawing on data collected from the second wave of the Asia Barometer (ABS) surveys 
(2005-2008), we explore how Asian publics from different regime contexts weigh between economic 
benefits and political goods.  Employing Bayesian multilevel analyses we find that the overall 
regime context strongly affects the manifestation of peoplH¶VLQVWUXPHQWDODQGLQWULQVLFVXSSRUW 
Public support in Asian societies is more sensitive to economic perceptions in autocracies than it is in 
GHPRFUDFLHVDQGSHRSOH¶VGHPRFUDWLFDIIHFWLRQVPDNHWKHPOHVVFULWLFDORIWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPLQ
democracies than in autocracies.  
 This study extends the literature by highlighting the contextual contingency of political support.  
It thus bridges the micro explanations of regime support and the macro theories of democratic 
transition and consolidation (Haggard and Kaufman forthcoming).  Increasingly, scholars have 
UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKH7KLUG:DYHJDYHULVHWRPDQ\³PHGLDQUHJLPHs´DVODEHOHGE\5RVHDQG0LVKOHU
RUZKDW/HYLWVN\DQG:D\FDOOHG³FRPSHWLWLYHDXWKRULWDULDQUHJLPHV´  Moreover, 
some revert to dictatorship after only a brief democratic period (Sovlik 2015).  Whereas most 
current studies focus on macro structural (e.g., economic development) and institutional factors (e.g., 
parliamentarism), this study highlights the important, yet understudied role of attitudinal changes.  
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By focusing on the ways in which popular support is contingent upon the varying regime context, 
this study provides an integrative perspective to understand the separate research enterprises on 
political support and regime change. 
 From a political perspective, a discussion on the interplay between correlates at the individual 
level and the regime setting at the country level is particularly important in the Asian context.  For 
example, in WKHUHJLRQ¶VUHVLOLHQWauthoritarian regimes, like Singapore, China, and Vietnam, the 
ostensibly high levels of regime support, despite decades of rapid economic development that have 
successfully boosted regime legitimacy, rest on a fragile basis and are highly vulnerable to periodic 
economic downturns and the rise of democratically minded citizens.  This contrasts sharply with the 
essential strength of democratic polities during periods of economic duress and the emergence of 
critical citizens (e.g., Mongolia).  The contextual contingency of regime support thus suggests that 
the seemingly idiosyncratic popular support is epiphenomenal on the more fundamental 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes in the region.   
 
Instrumental and Intrinsic Sources of Regime Support 
Conventional approaches to regime support focus primarily on correlates at the individual level.  It 
KDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVXSSRUWIRUDUHJLPHUHVWVPDLQO\RQWZRDWWLWXGLQDOEDVHV² 
instrumental calculations and intrinsic values (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Easton 1975; Lewis-Beck et 
al. 2013; Norris 1999a; Rose, Mishler, and Munro 2011).  To examine their relative salience, 
empirical studies focus on comparing the most direct form of instrumental consideration (i.e., 
economic orientation) on the one hand, and adherence to democratic principles on the other (e.g., 
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Bratton et al. 2005; Chu et al. 2008; Dalton 1999, 2004; Lagos 2003; Lewis-Beck et al. 2013; 
Przeworski et al. 1996; Rose et al. 2011).1  In a nutshell, ordinary citizens may comply with a 
UHJLPHHLWKHUEHFDXVHLW³SD\V´LQWHUPVRILPSURYLQJOLYLQJVWDQGDUGVRUEHFDXVHLWFRQIRUPVWRWKHLU
inherent political values.   
 However, until now there is still no scholarly consensus with regard to the relative importance of 
the two sources of political support in different regimes.  For instance, Dalton (2004) concludes 
³EHOLHIVPDWWHUPRUH´DIWHUDsystematic examination of political support in advanced industrial 
democracies.  It is the societal value changes (i.e., the diffusion of post-materialism), rather than 
economic performance, that explain the declining political support in these countries.  More 
recently, Conroy-.UXW]DQG.HUUQRWHWKDWFLWL]HQV¶DGKHUHQFHWRGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHVVWURQJO\
predicts their support for democracy as regime in developing and transitional countries like Uganda.  
On the other hand, however, Svolik¶s studies (2013; 2015) emphasize the importance of the 
economic performance in securing support for new democracies.  He finds that the SXEOLF¶V
dissatisfaction with economic well-beings often depletes their support for democracy as a political 
system.  Given the mixed evidence on the relative salience of the economic and value bases of 
political support, many scholars suggest that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reach any broad 
generalization across national boundaries (Booth and Seligson 2009; Rose et al. 2011). 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that economic orientation is merely a subset of materialist concerns, which in 
turn are a subset of instrumental consideration.  In other words, instrumental consideration 
encompasses many non-materialistic and non-economic concerns. 
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 In addition to factors at the individual level, scholars have also explored the direct impacts of 
contextual factors (Wells and Krieckhaus 2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2013).  Hellwig and Samuel 
(2008), for example, reveal that popular support for democratic government is strongly affected by 
the fundamental institutional differences between democratic regimes, that is, the separation of 
government branches.  Using experimental methods, Dickson et al. (2015) confirms that different 
institutional designs do shape individualV¶HYDOXDWLRQRI authority legitimacy.  Other studies also 
reveal that macro-level factors like party competition (Hellwig 2012), openness to world economy 
(Alcañiz and Hellwig 2011), and ethnic composition (Belge and Karakoç 2015) exert direct and 
significant impacts on LQGLYLGXDOV¶SROLWLFDOVXSSRUW 
 These individual- and contextual-level studies, though providing important insights about 
sources of regime support, are limited in two ways.  First, the indirect impacts of contextual factors 
have been understudied (Dalton and Anderson 2011).  In addition to direct influences, contextual 
factors can also exert strong indirect impacts by moderating the effects of individual psychologies 
like economic orientation and democratic value.  Second, with a focus mainly on democratic 
societies, few studies have examined how sources of regime vary across different regime types.  
This study attempts to advance current studies by treating the regime type as a contextual factor and 
focusing on the ways in which the regime context moderates the relationship between regime support 
and individual covariates.  It thus not only reveals more complex effect of macro institutional 
factors but also extend the existing understanding of political support to a wide range of regimes in a 
systematic way.  Particularly, we stress the importance of democracy as a regime type in shaping 
the effect of both instrumental economic calculations and intrinsic democratic values on regime 
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support across countries.   
 
The Contextual Contingency of Instrumental and Intrinsic Explanations 
Among various system attributes, the supply of democratic institutions has been regarded as one of 
the most important macro-level explanatory factors (Booth and Seligson 2009; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2013; Hellwig and Samuel 2008).  According to institutional theories, the democratic level of a 
particuODUUHJLPHVKRXOGEHSRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHSHRSOH¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKHUHJLPH  But the 
effect of democracy on regime support seems not to be as direct as presumed. For instance, after 
testing this hypothesis across 69 countries, Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2011) find that whether or not 
a regime is democratic bears no significant association with how it is evaluated by its citizens. 
 We argue this seemingly puzzling result has a lot to do with the unnoticed interactive nature of 
the effect of regime type on regime support.  Regime support varies not only because of variations 
LQWKHUHJLPHFRQWH[WRULQWKHSHRSOH¶VGLIIHUHQWHFRQRPLFSHUFHSWLRQVDQGGHPRFUDWLFFRPPLWPHQWV
but depending on the regime context, individuals tend to value economic and political goods 
differently.  That is, uQGHUGLIIHUHQWUHJLPHVHWWLQJVWKHVDPHFKDQJHVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VHFRQRPLF
well-being or democratic values are not likely to have identical impacts on their regime support.  
For this reason, instead of focusing solely on the absolute effects of the levels of economic 
considerations and democratic values, we should also pay attention to how their impacts vary 
depending on the regime setting.  We therefore synthesize arguments from previous studies to offer 
an integrative framework of regime support as follows (see Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 is about here.] 
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The sign in the boxes indicates the direction of the effect of economic perceptions and democratic 
values on regime support, and double signs indicate stronger effects in that direction.  One way to 
understand this context contingency involves a two-stage logic (Anderson and Singer 2008).  The 
first stage at the individual level serves as the direct causal mechanism connecting economic 
evaluations and democratic commitments to regime support; the second stage explains to what extent 
democratic institutions may alter the magnitude of the two kinds of support.  In the following, we 
proceed with this two-stage logic for instrumental economic support and intrinsic democratic 
support. 
Contextually Moderated Economic Support 
Economic perceptions are the most immediate explanation for political support.  As noted by 
Easton (1975) and later in the literature of economic vote (Lewis-Beck 2013), governments are first 
DQGIRUHPRVWLQVWUXPHQWDOO\HYDOXDWHGE\WKHLUFLWL]HQV  $JRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWLQXRXVIDLOXUHWR
LPSURYHLWVFLWL]HQV¶HFRQRPLFZHOO-EHLQJLVOLNHO\WRVLJQLILFDQWO\XQGHUPLQHWKHFLWL]HQV¶VXSSRUW
for the regime.  Empirical studies of political support conducted in both democratic (Hetherington 
1998; Przeworski et al. 1996) and non-democratic countries (Chen 2004; Lewis-Beck et al. 2014; Lü 
2014; Rose et al. 2011) have confirmed that individuals tend to positively relate their evaluations of 
economic conditions to regime support.  Therefore, we form our first-stage hypothesis on 
instrumental economic support as follows:  
HYPOTHESIS 1A: Individuals with more positive economic perceptions are more likely to be  
              oriented positively toward a regime.   
The impact of economic perceptions on regime support, however, is not uniform across different 
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regimes.  We argue that the positive impact of instrumental support is significantly and negatively 
PRGHUDWHGE\WKHUHJLPH¶VVXSSO\Rf democratic institutions.  This is because the very design of 
democratic institutions makes economic success or failure less attributable to the regime.  In 
democracies with institutionalized competition, effective electoral procedures, and resultant office 
alteration, the incumbent governments or particular politicians, and not the overall political system, 
are likely to be held accountable for economic performance (Duch and Stevenson 2008; 
Conroy-Krutz and Kerr 2015). 
 On the other hand, economic accountability in authoritarian countries is more closely associated 
with the regime.  A key characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the natural fusion of the ruling 
elites and the regime.  When considering economic performance, citizens in non-democracies can 
hardly distinguish between the incumbents and the regime, and thus they readily attribute their 
economic well-being to the malignancy or benignancy of the regime (Brancati 2014).  Thus, 
authoritarian regimes, though they may enjoy all the benefits entailed by economic growth, are also 
likely to take full responsibility for any economic downturns.  In sum, when evaluating a regime, 
economic perceptions are likely to matter more for people who live in authoritarian regimes and less 
for those living in democracies.  Therefore, we hypothesize the second-stage logic of instrumental 
support as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1B: As the regime supply of democratic institutions increases, the positive impact of 
              economic perceptions on regime support will decrease. 
Contextually Moderated Intrinsic Support 
,QWHUQDOL]HGYDOXHV³SURYLGHDFRQWH[WZLWKLQZKLFKWKHSROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUHDQGUHODWHGQRUPVPD\
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WKHPVHOYHVEHWHVWHGIRUWKHLUOHJLWLPDF\´(DVWRQ  These intrinsic values determine the 
benchmark against which individuals evaluate the regime in general and the political institutions in 
particular.  Therefore, in authoritarian regimes, those who strongly believe in democratic values are 
unlikely to regard authoritarian rule as legitimate.  Yet, democratically minded citizens in 
democracies do not necessarily support their regimes while they surely prefer a democracy to a 
autocracy.  Dalton (2004, 109) finds that the declining political support in these societies has a lot to 
GRZLWKWKHFLWL]HQV¶ULVLQJGHPRFUDWLFDVSLUDWLRQV³>:@KDWLVFKDQJLQJLVFLWL]HQH[SHFWDWLRQVRI
what democracy should achieve.  Postmaterialists have higher democratic ideals, and it is of this 
higher standard that contemporary politicians aQGSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVIDOOVKRUW´  ,Qshort, higher 
democratic ideals make the public more critical of the actual operations and practices of democratic 
systems.  Hence, the first-stage hypothesis of intrinsic support can be stated as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A: Individuals with stronger democratic aspirations are less likely to be oriented 
              positively toward the regime.   
The impact of democratic aspirations also varies depending on the regime setting.  We argue that 
the negative impact of democratic aspirations on regime support is significantly and negatively 
moderated by the regime supply of democratic institutions.  Since the institutional context serves to 
RUJDQL]HDQGFRQVWUDLQRQH¶VH[SHULHQFHDQGWRDOORZRQHWRGHYHORSDWWLWXGHVUHJDUGLQJWKHZRUNLQJ
of the system, stable political systems tend to have cultures and institutions that are congruent with 
citizens¶ demand for a certain type of regime.  Authoritarian-minded people in non-democracies 
therefore are more supportive of the governing regime than those in democracies; as a corollary, 
democratic-minded people in non-democracies are more critical than their counterparts in 
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democracies.  &DUOLQDQG0RVHO\¶Vrecent study shows that true democrats attach greater 
importance to democratic procedures and are less tolerant of activities like vote-buying.  
Accordingly, the second-stage hypothesis of intrinsic support can be stated as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2B: As the regime supply of democratic institutions increases, the negative impact 
              of democratic aspirations on regime support will decrease. 
 
Data and Measurement 
To examine the moderating role of regime context LQFRQGLWLRQLQJSHRSOH¶VLQVWUXPHQWDO economic 
and intrinsic value support, this study focuses on Asia, a relatively understudied region in the 
literature.  A study of East Asian societies contributes to comparative studies of political support for 
a number of reasons.  First, the debate over whether popular support is economy-driven or 
democracy-driven is particularly marked in Asia (Chu et al. 2008; Lewis-Beck et al. 2014).  In 
contrast to its global acceptance, liberal democracy is openly rejected by many East and Southeast 
Asian government officials based on their economic success (Thompson 2001).  Moreover, Asian 
SXEOLFVVHHPWREH³contingent democrats for the very reason that they are consistent defenders of 
WKHLUPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWV´%HOOLQ9, italics in original).  This raises the question of whether 
the orientations of East Asian publics are so instrumentally driven that the development of 
GHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQVEHFRPHVLQFRQJUXHQW&KXHWDO  ³7KHFXUUHQWERG\RIHYLGHQFHRQ
East $VLDQSROLWLFDOFXOWXUH´KRZHYHU³LVLQFRPSOHWHDQGRIWHQOLPLWHGWRVLQJOHQDWLRQVWXGLHV´
(Dalton and Shin 2006, 4).   
 Second, and relatedly, ³$VLDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVP´KDVFRQVWDQWO\FRQIXVHGJOREDOSDWWHUQVRI
 11 
sociopolitical development (Fukuyama 1997).  After the third wave of democratization, on the one 
hand, the region contained not only the most-likely cases of democratic transition and consolidation, 
for instance in South Korea or Taiwan, but also the least-likely successful cases, for instance in 
Mongolia (Fish 1998).  However, the Asian authoritarian states seem to be the most resilient in the 
world, particularly after the recent Arab Spring.  Countries like China and Vietnam still enjoy 
considerable levels of popular support, and they remain unexpectedly stable.  This mixed pattern in 
one single region makes it important that we examine the public basis in different regimes and 
investigate the actual contribution of the institutional supply of democracy for regime stability in 
both authoritarian and democratic polities in East Asia.   
 Finally, the countries in East Asia are substantially different from one another with regard to 
contextual-level factors, such as institutional supplies of democracy, levels of economic development, 
and pace of economic growth.  These large variations in contextual factors provide a perfect pool 
for examining the moderating effects of system-level factors.   
 This study uses a compiled dataset in which the individual-level data are drawn from the second 
wave of the ABS.2  This wave of the ABS FDUULHGRXWDFRPSDUDWLYHVXUYH\RIFLWL]HQV¶DWWLWXGHV
toward politics and democracy in thirteen Asian polities.  In each of the surveyed polity, a 
country-wide face-to-face survey was conducted using standardized survey methodology and 
instruments. 
Dependent Variable: Regime Support 
                                                             
2 Information about ABS is available from <http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/>. 
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Regime support in this study is derived from two widely used questions³:KDWHYHULWVIDXOWVPD\
EHRXUIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQWLVVWLOOWKHEHVWIRUXV´DQG³<RXFDQJHQHUDOO\WUXVWWKHpeople who 
UXQRXUJRYHUQPHQWWRGRZKDWLVULJKW´  5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGWRUDWHHDFK statement on a 
4-SRLQWVFDOHIURP³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´WR³VWURQJO\DJUHH´  :HDYHUDJHGWKHUHVSRQVHVWR
these two items to capture a collective profile of thHUHVSRQGHQWV¶UHJLPHVXSSRUW.  First, both 
reliability and correlation checks indicate a reliable composite index.  Second, we also conducted 
Mokken scale analysis (MSA) to ensure the validity of our latent construct (for details about MSA 
see Section C in Supplementary Information).  In essence, MSA is a nonparametric extension of the 
Guttman scaling and is particularly useful in exploring ordered and cumulative scales (van Schuur 
2011).  Finally, we used each of the two items separately as dependent variables as a robustness 
check.  This helps to minimize the possible influence of the operationalization, and thus ensures 
that our results are not artificially driven by the choice of composite method.   
[Figure 2 is about here.] 
To detect the magnitude of country-level variations, we contrast the actual country averages of 
UHJLPHVXSSRUWZLWKVLPXODWHGPHDQV  $VSUHVHQWHG)LJXUHDWKHEDUVUHSUHVHQWHDFKFRXQWU\¶V
average regime support sorted from highest to lowest, and the lines represent the expected 
distribution if there were no country-level attributes associated with the data.  The sharp contrast 
between the simulated (i.e., the lines) and the actual average regime support (i.e., the bars) suggests 
country-level factors KDYHDVWURQJLPSDFWRQSHRSOH¶VUHJLPHVXSSRUWLQ$VLD   
 However, as revealed in Figure 2(b), responses to these questions demonstrate interesting yet 
puzzling patterns.  The discrepancy between popular political support and the regime supply of 
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democratic institutions, as stressed by Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2011), appears to be particularly 
sharp in Asia.  The regime supply of democratic institutions is negatively correlated with public 
support.  A majority of respondents in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan reported a relatively low 
level of regime support, which is consistent with findings from established democracies in other 
regions (Dalton 2004).  In contrast, although observers often assume that authoritarian regimes like 
China and Vietnam lack popular support, they each have been able to maintain relatively high levels 
of political support.  Moreover, countries like Mongolia, though without a potent democracy, have 
been able to maintain a very high level of regime support. 
Explanatory Variables at the Individual Level 
7RXQGHUVWDQGWKHVRXUFHVRIUHJLPHVXSSRUWDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOZHIRFXVRQSHRSOH¶V
instrumental calculations of material benefits and normative commitments to democratic norms and 
values.  In this study, we employ a standard definition of economic orientationLHWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶
evaluation of the economic situation in the household.  In the ABSRQH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH
HFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQDUHJDXJHGLQWKUHHZD\VWKHUHWURVSHFWLYH³+RZZRXOG\RXFRPSDUHWKH
current economic FRQGLWLRQVRI\RXUIDPLO\ZLWKWKRVHRIVHYHUDO\HDUVDJR"´WKHSUHVHQW³$VIRU
\RXURZQIDPLO\KRZGR\RXUDWH\RXUHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQWRGD\"´DQGWKHSURVSHFWLYH³:KDWGR
you think the economic situation of your family will be in a few years from QRZ"´  Due to limited 
space, we only present results based on the retrospective evaluation.  To ensure that our analysis is 
not biased by the choice of measurements, we also analyzed the effects of the other two 
measurements on regime support (for details see Section D in Supplementary Information). 
 Democracy is essentially a contested concept.  Moreover, given the global acceptance of the 
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ideal, direct questions regarding a democratic commitment are likely to produce socially desirable 
answers (Chu et al. 2008; Mishler and Rose 2001).  With these caveats in mind, we turn to 
questions that make no explicit reference to democracy but are critical to the emergence and 
ÀRXULVKLQJRIGHPRFUDF\.  Specifically, we FKRVHWRPHDVXUHRQH¶VGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHVEDVHGRQD
EDWWHU\RIVL[TXHVWLRQVWKDWDVNDERXWWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶DJUHHPHQWZLWKdemocratic procedures ³:H
should abolish parliament and electiRQVDQGKDYHDVWURQJOHDGHUWRPDNHGHFLVLRQV´³7KHDUP\
VKRXOGEHEURXJKWLQWRJRYHUQWKHFRXQWU\´³:KHQWKHFRXQWU\IDFHVGLIILFXOWFLUFXPVWDQFHLWLV
DFFHSWDEOHIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRGLVUHJDUGWKHODZLQRUGHUWRGHDOZLWKWKHVLWXDWLRQ´³*RYHUQPHnt 
OHDGHUVDUHOLNHWKHKHDGRIDIDPLO\ZHVKRXOGIROORZDOOWKHLUGHFLVLRQV´³:KHQMXGJHVGHFLGH
LPSRUWDQWFDVHVWKH\VKRXOGDFFHSWWKHYLHZRIWKHH[HFXWLYHEUDQFK´³,IWKHJRYHUQPHQWLV
constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accoPSOLVKJUHDWWKLQJV´  $OWKRXJKWKHVH
items do not exhaust all democratic procedures, together they provide a clear conceptual anchoring 
and hence they serve as a good test of the popular democratic commitment across the East Asian 
societies. 
 Given its FRQWHVWHGQDWXUHZHXVHGERWK06$DQGIDFWRUDQDO\VLVWRH[SORUH$VLDQSXEOLF¶V
latent understanding of democracy, and two findings have emerged (for details see Section B and C 
in Supplementary Information).  First, both MSA and factor analysis provide a unidimensional 
solution, that is, a single latent construct of democratic value.  The congruence suggests that even 
under different sociopolitical settings, the Asian public share certain common understandings about 
the key principles of democracy.  Second, MSA and factor analysis differ on the specific items that 
should be preserved.  While factor analysis incorporates all the six items, MSA preserves only the 
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first two items.  By removing the other four items, MSA helps reveal the core of democratic value 
that FRXOGEHPDVNHGE\D³FDWFK-all´ factor.  Specifically, the results of MSA suggest that ordinary 
people across Asian societies tended to treat strong legislative branch and civilian government as the 
core principles of democracy.  The result is surprisingly consistent with recent aggregate-level 
findings that most democratic breakdowns can be attributed to presidential takeovers and military 
coups (Svolik 2015).  To test our hypotheses in a more rigorous manner, we employ both the 
³FDWFK-DOO´index and the ³core´ Mokken scale in the subsequent analysis. 
Explanatory Variables at the Country Level 
In this paper we mainly presented results based on the popular dataset on democracy³'HPRFUDF\
DQG'LFWDWRUV´''WRWHVWRXUK\SRWKHVHV  ''LVDdichotomous measurement of democracy 
updated from the political and economic database compiled by Przeworski et al (2000).  It 
categorizes a polity as a democracy if the executive is elected via the legislature or if the legislature 
is directly elected, if there is more than one political party, or if there is an alternation of executive 
power.  By capturing the essential characteristics of democracy, DD has been one of the most 
widely used measures of democracy.3 
 
 We further control for a variety of factors that have been found in previous studies to predict 
                                                             
3 To ensure that our analytical results are not driven by the choice of a particular measurement of 
democracy, we also conducted analysis based on another two measures of democracy, Freedom 
House (FH), anGWKH³8QLILHG'HPRFUDF\6FRUH´8'6 
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UHJLPHVXSSRUW  $WWKHLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOLQDGGLWLRQWRRQH¶VHFRQRPLFFDOFXODWLRQVDQGGHPRFUDWLF
beliefs, we include socio-demographic factors (i.e., gender, age, education, urban residence, marriage 
status, internal political efficacy, and interpersonal trust).4  At the country level, we control for two 
other contextual factors (i.e., GDP per capita and the economic growth rate).   
 
Analysis and Results 
To test our hypotheses, we employ multilevel analysis.  Compared to no-pooling (e.g., 
country-based) and traditional pooling analysis, multilevel analysis not only allows for a more 
accurate estimation of the direct effects of both the individual and contextual correlates, but also 
examines cross-level interactions between key contextual factors and individual factors.  Multilevel 
models have thus become increasingly popular in comparative political research.  However, a 
common problem in their application is that most comparative survey datasets contain a relatively 
small number of countries.  This may cause biased maximum likelihood (ML) estimations in a 
frequentist framework, leading to a proposal for various rules of thumb about the minimum number 
of countries.5   
 In this study, we adopt several strategies to address this issue.  First, rather than relying on the 
frequentist ML estimation, we use the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Bayesian multilevel 
                                                             
4 See Table A.1 in Supplementary Information for the summary statistics.   
5 A recent comprehensive review suggests that the recommendation ranges from 8 to 30, 50, or even 
100.  See Stegmueller (2013, 2).   
 17 
model to test our hypotheses.  Unlike the ML estimation, the Bayesian estimation does not make 
strong assumptions about the sampling distribution and thus it is much less biased when there are a 
small number of macro units.  Specifically, the Bayesian confidence intervals (i.e., credible 
intervals) simply provides WKH³SRVWHULRULHDIWHUORRNLQJDWWKH data) probability that the 
coefficient lies in that LQWHUYDO´ (Stegmueller, 2013, 3).  In this process, no hypothetical sampling 
distribution is assumed.  6WHJPXHOOHU¶V(2013) further comparison reveals that Bayesian estimation 
is not only less biased but it is also more rigorous and conservative than the ML estimation.6  
Second, to further avoid any potential bias, we first include only one macro variable (i.e., the primary 
variable ² democracy) and its interaction term with only one of the two key micro explanatory 
variables (i.e., economic perceptions and democratic values) in each set of analyses.  This 
minimizes consumption of the degree of freedom at the aggregate level.  We then present analytical 
results based on models with interaction terms for democracy and two micro independent variables 
and in tandem include more aggregate variables.  Finally, to ensure the robustness of our analyses, 
we test the hypotheses by varying the measurement of the dependent variable (i.e., regime support), 
for the key explanatory variable at the aggregate level (i.e., democracy), and for the independent 
variable at the individual level (i.e., economic evaluation and democratic values).7  Together, we 
                                                             
6 We use the MLwiN from within STATA and the package R2MLwiN in R for the estimation.  
More details about the MCMC estimation and the estimation procedures are available upon request.   
7 For more detailed results of Bayesian multilevel analyses, please see Section D of Supplementary 
Information. 
 18 
believe a combination of these strategies produces a rigorous empirical test for our hypotheses.   
[Table 1 is about here.] 
Table 1 presents the results of our first set of analyses using the retrospective economic evaluation 
and WKH³FDWFK-DOO´measurement of democratic values (i.e., the index based on factor analysis).8  
Model 1 includes only one cross-level effect (i.e., the interaction term between regime type and 
economic perception), and two findings stand out.  First, after controlling for regime type, both 
economic perception and democratic value exert strong impacts on regime support, which confirm 
our two first-stage Hypotheses 1A and 2A.  Second, a significant and negative cross-level effect 
between economic perception and regime type indicates that economic perception is less related to 
the level of regime support in democratic countries, and thus it confirms the second-stage hypothesis 
1B.  Although people in both types of regimes base their support on economic perceptions, people 
in democratic countries are less likely to do so than their counterparts in authoritarian countries. 
 Model 2 then focuses on the other cross-level effect, the interaction between regime type and 
democratic value (Hypothesis 2B).  First, as expected in Hypotheses 1A and 2A, effects of 
economic perception and democratic value are both significant and consistent.  Second, the 
interaction term between democratic value and democracy is positive, indicating a stronger positive 
effect of democratic values on regime support in democratic countries.  In both types of regimes, 
                                                             
8 Due to limited space, we do not present the estimated results of controls at the individual level.  
For detailed results and additional robustness analyses, please see Section D in Supplementary 
Information. 
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the effect of democratic values is negative.  But the same level of democratic values is associated 
with a higher level of regime support in democratic countries than it is in authoritarian countries.  
The results thus strongly confirm our hypothesis about the contingent effect of democratic value.   
 We further test the two cross-level effects jointly in Model 3.  At the individual level, consistent 
with Models 1 and 2, WKHUHVXOWVVWURQJO\FRUURERUDWH+\SRWKHVHV$DQG$WKDWSHRSOH¶VHFRQRPLF
orientation and political value fundamentally shape their support for the ruling regime.  As for their 
contextual contingency (i.e., Hypotheses 1B and 2B), the two significant cross-level effects suggest 
the impacts of both economic orientation and political value are strongly shaped by the regime type.  
While economic perceptions are less important for regime support in democracies, and adherence to 
democratic principles makes people more critical of the political system in authoritarian. 
[Figure 3 is about here.] 
To provide more meaningful interpretations to the varying effects of the two primary independent 
variables, Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of economic perception (Figure 3[a]) and the effect of 
democratic value (Figure 3[b]), respectively, based on Model 3.  It should be noted that the 
marginal effects plotted here are all within the value ranges of DD measures of democracy, that is, 
between 0 and 1.9  With respect to economic perception, first we see that their effect on regime 
support is statistically significant and positive in both types of countries.  Those who have been 
better off under any regime hold more favorable attitudes toward that regime.  Second, the positive 
DVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQUHJLPHVXSSRUWDQGRQH¶VHFRQRPLFHYDOXDWLRQGHFUHDVHVZLWKKLJKHUOHYHOVRI
                                                             
9 See Table A.1 in Supplementary Information for the summary statistics of DD and FH.   
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democracy.  For instance, in Figure 3[a] while the estimated coefficient of instrumental calculation 
is 0.07 for countries like China and Vietnam (i.e., DD = 0), the same coefficient for Japan and 
Mongolia (DD = 1) is about 0.045.  In other words, people in democratic countries are less likely to 
judge the regime based on their instrumental rationality.   
 In contrast, democratic value always has a statistically significant and negative effect on regime 
support in both democratic and authoritarian countries (Figure 3[b]).  This shows that people who 
hold a higher level of democratic values are more critical of the ruling regime, regardless of the type 
of regime.  It also shows that the detrimental effect of democratic values on regime support is much 
stronger in authoritarian countries than it is in democratic countries.  As revealed in Figure 3[b], 
while the estimated coefficient of democratic aspiration is -0.42 for autocracies (DD = 0), the same 
coefficient for democracies (DD = 1) is about -0.34.  Although people who hold high levels of 
democratic values are still critical of democratic polities, they are less so than people who live under 
authoritarian regimes where the political institutions are fundamentally in conflict with their intrinsic 
values.10 
 Model 4 includes two more variables at the country level: GDP per capita and the growth rate of 
GDP per capita.  The patterns of the regression results, again, conform to what we have obtained in 
the previous analyses.  It should be noted that economic growth is strongly associated with higher 
levels of regime support, which is consistent with many recent findings that economic crisis strongly 
                                                             
10 For more marginal plots based on different model specifications, see Section D of Supplementary 
Information. 
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predicts regime transition, both democratic transition (Tang et al. forthcoming) and authoritarian 
reversal (Svolik 2015).  Models 5 and 6 check the robustness by regressing the two components of 
the regime support index separately on the same set of independent, interactive, and control variables.  
The general pattern in the results is similar to that yielded by analyses using the composite index of 
regime support, except for the statistical insignificance of one of the four interaction terms.11 
[Table 2 is about here.] 
Using the Mokken scale of democratic value, Table 2 tests WKHK\SRWKHVHVDJDLQVWWKH³FRUH´
democratic value of Asian public (i.e., strong legislative branch and civilian government).  From 
Model 7 to 10, we carry out similar analyses based on the model specifications of Model 1 to 4.  
Across the four models based on the Mokken scale, the effects of economic perception and 
democratic value are consistently significant, which strongly corroborate Hypotheses 1A and 2A.  
More important, as we have expected in Hypotheses 1B and 2B, the coefficients of both interaction 
terms are statistically significant but in opposite directions, which is consistent with the findings in 
Table 1. 
 It should be noted that, as reveal in Figure 2[b], the downward relationship between democracy 
and averaged regime support at the country-level can be highly sensitive to the particular sample of 
surveyed countries.  If respondents of Korea were removed, the country-level relationship between 
                                                             
11  In Section D of Support Information, we include more robustness analyses by using different 
measures of economic orientation (i.e., present and prospect).  We also use the Freedom House 
index and the UDS as alternative measurements of democracy, and the results are consistent. 
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democracy and averaged regime support could be a U-shaped one.  And if Vietnam were left out, 
the best fit line would be horizontal, which implies no the country-level relationship.  To address 
the potential biases introduced by these high-leverage cases, Models 11 and 12 test our hypotheses 
by removing Korea and Vietnam respectively.  The results of two models are highly consistent with 
our previous analyses. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study presents an integrative perspective to understand instrumental and intrinsic support by 
emphasizing their contextual contingency.  Our arguments and findings suggest that although both 
economic perceptions and democratic values strongly affect regime support, the magnitude of their 
impacts is contingent upon the macro contexts, particularly the regime setting.  Specifically, an 
economic calculation is found to be less important for regime support in democratic countries than it 
is in authoritarian countries, and a democratic affection makes people more critical of the political 
system in authoritarian countries than in democratic countries.   
 The contextual contingency of regime support suggested in this study not only opens new 
avenues for theorizing about the formation of regime support, but it also provides a different 
perspective with respect to some puzzling issues in the literature on political support as well as 
regime transition in general.  First, it helps account for the seemingly inconsistent findings 
regarding the relative importance of instrumental and intrinsic support.  The reason these two types 
of support vary across national borders is that they carry different weights under different regimes.  
Studies based upon a single country or a pooled global sample may conceal the variation in the 
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relationship of interest.   
 Second, by exploring the moderating effect of regime type, this study uncovers the contribution 
of a democratic political system to political support.  Given the discrepancy between the regime 
setting and popular political support in East Asia, as well as in other parts of the world, many have 
raised doubts about the relevance of democracy for regime support.  This study suggests that 
democracy might not directly boost regime support.  But it might do so indirectly by altering how 
the people weigh between economic and political goods.  In a more democratic regime, people tend 
to attach less importance to economic gains and they tend to be are less critical of the regime, and 
hence a democracy is more stable and viable when confronted with periodic economic downturns 
and the emergence of critical citizens. 
 Our findings also have important implications for scholarly understanding about regime 
transition.  As revealed in this study, to maintain popular support authoritarian rulers must avoid 
economic slowdowns since public attitudes are highly sensitive to the economic performance of the 
regime.  When an economic crisis occurs, political transition may become possible since a large 
population of disaffected citizens is likely to trigger a collapse of the uneasy coalition between the 
political elites and other social forces (Tang et al. forthcoming; Yap 2011).  But even if the 
government is able to maintain growth, economic development engenders societal changes that will 
eventually raise public aspirations for democratic values.  An increased democratic orientation, as 
suggested by this study, will seriously undermine public support for an authoritarian regime.  
Without political liberalization, therefore, the basis for public support for the regime cannot be 
effectively secured.  As for new democracies, the findings from this study imply that as long as 
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WKHUHLVFRQWLQXRXVLPSURYHPHQWLQ³GHPRFUDWLFJRRGV´WKHQHJDWLYHHffects of periodic economic 
hardships tend to be moderated.  This is consistent with findings that well-institutionalized political 
competition stabilizes new democracies (Wright 2008; Fung 2011). 
 It should be noted that we do not LQWHQGWRJHQHUDOL]HWKH¿QGLQJVRIWKLVAsian sample to the rest 
of world.  Nonetheless, we GREHOLHYHWKDWWKH¿QGLQJVIURPWKLVVWXG\DQG their implications can 
contribute to our understanding of the central question about the complex sources of regime support.  
As an effort to explore underlying sources of regime support in Asia, this study is inevitably limited 
in its revealing of the complex nature and sources of support.  Particularly, we find our theorization 
and operationalization of key political attitudes are still far from being adequate.  Factor analysis 
and MSA in this study, though both provide a unidimensional solution, differ on specific survey 
items should be regarded as democratic value.  More studies are thus called for to improve our 
survey instruments in the cross-national settings (Alemán and Woods forthcoming). 
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Table 1. Bayseian Multilevel Estimate and Posterior Deviation of Regime Support in East Asia 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model 5 
Support1 
Model 6 
Support2  
Economic perception 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.07** 0.06** 0.08** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Democratic value -0.39** -0.43** -0.44** -0.44** -0.36** -0.54** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Country-level effects       
  Democracy -0.13 -0.42** -0.40* -0.16 -0.31 -0.53* 
 [0.19] [0.19] [0.21] [0.18] [0.19] [0.26] 
  GDP per capita (log)    0.002   
      [0.05]   
  GDP growth    0.10*   
    [0.05]   
Cross-level effects       
  Economic perception* -0.02*  -0.02** -0.02** -0.02* -0.02* 
    Democracy   [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
  Democratic value*  0.08** 0.07** 0.07** 0.02 0.13** 
    Democracy    [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] 
Controls (individual level)       
  Omitted       
 
Note:  Entries are Bayesian multilevel coefficients (i.e., the average effects) and corresponding 
posterior deviations (in brackets).  **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, and p < 0.1.  Datasets include 19,788 
respondents in 13 polities.   
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Table 2. Bayseian Multilevel Analysis based the Mokken Scale 
 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Model 11 
No KOR 
Mode 12 
No VNM  
Economic perception 0.05** 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
 [0.01] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.01] 
Democratic value -0.02** -0.02** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Country-level effects       
  Democracy -0.14 -0.22* -0.18 -0.05 -0.15 -0.15 
 [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10] 
  GDP per capita (log)    -0.02   
      [0.02]   
  GDP growth    0.06*   
    [0.02]   
Cross-level effects       
  Economic perception* -0.02*  -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
    Democracy   [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
  Democratic value*  0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
    Democracy    [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Controls (individual level)       
  Omitted       
 
Note:  Entries are Bayesian multilevel coefficients (i.e., the average effects) and corresponding 
posterior deviations (in brackets).  **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, and p < 0.1.  Datasets include 19,788 
respondents in 13 polities. 
 
 33 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Expected Context-Contingency of Regime Support 
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Figure 2. Regime Support in East Asia 
 
Note:  The solid line in (a) represents a random distribution where 13 pseudo polities were 
created 100 times and the sorted values were averaged across 1,000 iterations.  The dotted lines 
represent the upper and lower 95% confidence interval estimates.  In (b), UDS refers to the 
³8QLILHG'HPRFUDF\6FRUHV´Pemstein et al. 2010).   
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      (a)          (b)   
 
Figure 3. The Marginal Effects of Economic Perceptions and Democratic Values 
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